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ABSTRACT  
 
 
Prior literature suggests that a focus on employee and customer relations alone improves 
financial performance.  However, I find that a focus on employee and customer relations alone is 
not related to higher earnings persistence, but rather I hypothesize and find that the alignment of 
employee and customer relations with competitive strategy is related to higher earnings 
persistence.  I further explore this relation by examining the contextual environment in which the 
firm operates.  I consider the moderating variables of firm size, leverage, growth, and corporate 
governance and find that alignment impacts the persistence of earnings for leverage and 
governance but not for firm size or growth. I then examine the relation between a firm’s 
alignment and the market’s reaction to the firm’s reported earnings.  The analysis suggests that 
alignment is critical for cost leaders but is relatively less important for differentiators.  Taken as 
a whole the findings suggest that firm alignment plays a role in earnings quality and is useful to 
investors in their interpretation of earnings. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This study examines how earnings persistence is impacted when a firm’s employee and 
customer relations are aligned with the firm’s competitive strategy.  The literature supports the 
position that strong employee and customer relations lead to persistent earnings (Heskett et al., 
2008; Heskett et al., 1994), but earnings persistence has not been the focus of these previous 
studies and was not tested directly.  I specifically test the persistence of earnings and examine the 
market’s reaction to reported earnings based on the alignment of the firm’s employee and 
customer relations with its competitive strategy.  My findings suggest that alignment is 
associated with more persistent earnings and is understood by market participants including 
financial analysts.   
Strong employee and customer relations lead to high levels of customer satisfaction 
regarding the firm (Heskett et al., 2008), help connect customers to the brand (Bhattacharya and 
Sen, 2004), and thereby improve the firm’s reputation (Bhattacharya and Sen, 2004).  Highly 
satisfied customers are brand-loyal customers, and these branding and reputational benefits 
generate higher revenues (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Mescon and Tilson, 1987; Heskett et al., 
1994) and lower operating costs through greater employee retention and productivity (Willard, 
2002).  Higher revenues and lower costs lead to higher profits, creating stability for the firm even 
during difficult economic times.  By building strong employee and customer relations, firms tend 
to increase total earnings and earnings persistence, which has been shown to improve the 
company’s resilience to recessions (Godfrey, 2005).   
The emphasis placed on employee and customer relations varies by firm, and this 
variation should be highly correlated with the competitive strategy chosen by the firm.  Porter 
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(1998) argues a firm’s competitive strategy can be described as one of three basic approaches: 
the differentiator, the cost leader, or “caught in the middle”.  The differentiator is able to earn a 
higher gross margin on its products by creating the perception of uniqueness.  The cost leader’s 
competitive position in the marketplace is maintained by structuring its operations for high 
volume at the lowest possible cost, resulting in a relatively lower gross margin per transaction, 
but offset by higher sales volume.  Porter (1998) contends that “caught in the middle” is a 
strategy firms should attempt to avoid.  So while a firm can create value for its customers 
through high quality employee and customer relations, comparisons between firms that focus on 
employee and customer relations and those that do not should be considered within a given 
competitive strategy rather than between strategies. The relative importance of persistent 
earnings within a given competitive strategy should be similar and comparable but the relative 
importance of persistent earnings might not hold in comparisons between strategies.  
Miles and Snow (1978) describe the focus a firm places on employee and customer 
relations as changing through time.  Firms are always seeking to “adapt” their structures and 
strategies to properly align themselves within their competitive marketplace (Miles and Snow, 
1985).  Alignment is not a status that once achieved, no longer needs to be addressed, but rather, 
alignment is a continuous process whereby a firm constantly makes changes to achieve optimal 
performance within a given competitive strategy.  Through the development of a high level of 
alignment the firm is able to generate more predictable earnings which, in turn, lowers estimation 
risk for financial statement users (Sant and Cowan, 1994). The literature suggests that lower 
estimation risk increases the precision of market participant’s estimates (Barry and Brown, 1985; 
Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Merton, 1987).  More persistent earnings in combination with more 
precise estimates, increase financial statement user’s confidence in reported numbers.  As  
3 
 
investors rely more heavily on earnings, the relative importance of analysts’ forecasts declines.  
Analysts have less “new” information to share with investors as more information is capture by 
earnings.  This study shows that alignment between the firm’s focus on employee and customer 
relations and the firm’s competitive strategy, provide relatively more persistent earnings and this 
increase in earnings quality is understood by market participants. 
In this study I contrast firms that have aligned their investment in employee and customer 
relations with the firm’s competitive strategy (Aligned Firms) with those that have not aligned 
their investment in employee and customer relations with the firm’s competitive strategy 
(Misaligned Firms), and I hypothesize that earnings persistence will be higher for Aligned Firms 
than for Misaligned Firms.  I test this hypothesis using both a simple model with no control 
variables as well as a model that includes controls variables which follow prior literature.  I then 
examine key firm characteristics: firm size, the level of firm indebtedness, the level of firm 
growth, and the strength of the firm’s corporate governance and consider the impact each of 
these characteristics have on earnings persistence for Aligned and Misaligned Firms.   
I find that simply focusing on employee and customer relations alone does not result in 
higher earnings persistence; however, Aligned Firms are associated with higher earnings 
persistence.  The results further suggest that it is this alignment of the firm’s focus with its 
competitive strategy that is critical in understanding earnings persistence when considering the 
level of firm indebtedness, and corporate governance.  My results provide no support for the 
existence of a relation between earnings persistence and firm size or the level of firm growth.  
Additionally I test the relation between abnormal return and unexpected earnings for Aligned 
and Misaligned Firms.  I find a strong positive relation between unexpected earnings and 
abnormal returns for Aligned Firms pursuing a cost leadership strategy, but no relation between 
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unexpected earnings and abnormal returns for Aligned firms pursuing a differentiator strategy.  
These results are further supported by my findings in relation to the incremental explanatory 
power of consensus analysts’ forecasts.  For Aligned Firms, both differentiators and cost leaders, 
exhibit lower incremental explanatory power of analysts’ forecasts as compared to Misaligned 
Firms.  I interpret this finding to suggest that Aligned Firms have more information captured by 
earnings leaving analysts with less opportunity to incrementally add to the market’s 
understanding through their forecast. 
This study contributes to the literature by showing that the alignment of a firm’s focus on 
employee and customer relations and its chosen competitive strategy is useful in understanding 
earnings persistence.  The study also shows that the market is aware of the importance of 
alignment and that market participants seek out additional information in the absence of 
alignment.  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II briefly discusses 
related literature and develops the hypothesis; Section III describes the sample selection and 
defines the variables used in the analysis; Section IV explains the design of the research 
methodology; Section V presents the empirical results; and Section VI summarizes the findings 
from the study, discusses known limitations and concludes. 
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II. RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 The interconnection between employee and customer relations is well founded in the 
literature, and employee satisfaction is the beginning step in a chain of cause-and-effect relations 
which lead to improved profitability.   Employee satisfaction fuels employee loyalty and 
productivity, which in turn boosts the level of value provided to the firm’s customers, which then 
increases customer satisfaction and loyalty (Heskett et al., 1994).  Customer satisfaction has been 
linked to firm profitability (Luo and Homburg, 2007) a willingness to pay a premium (Homburg 
et al., 2005), a decrease in sensitivity to price changes (Stock, 2005), and an increase in the 
likelihood of becoming a repeat customer (Mittal and Kamakura, 2001; Olsen, 2002).  Firms 
with brand-loyal customers generate higher revenues (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Mescon and 
Tilson, 1987; Heskett et al., 1994) and enjoy lower operating costs through greater employee 
retention and productivity (Willard, 2002).  Higher revenues and lower costs lead to higher 
profits.  This chain of cause-and-effect relationships suggests that if a firm invests in its 
employee and customer relations, the firm should generate more persistent earnings, a quality 
that is important to current and future investors as well as financial analysts (Verrecchia, 2001; 
Barron et al., 2009; Demirakos et al., 2004). 
However, the decision to invest in employee and customer relations must be considered 
in the context of the competitive strategy chosen by the firm.  Porter (1998) classifies a firm’s 
competitive strategy as one of the following: a differentiator, a cost leader, or “caught in the 
middle”.  Following this classification, a differentiator is a firm that provides a good or service 
that is perceived by the customers to possess certain unique features.  It is this uniqueness that 
allows the differentiator to earn a higher gross margin than its competitors.  On the other hand, 
the cost leader structures its operations to minimize costs.  The cost leader charges a lower price 
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for its product and is willing to earn a lower gross margin per unit with the expectation that the 
cost leader will be able to sell relatively more units.  Porter (1998) recommends firms avoid 
being “caught in the middle”.  This system of classification for competitive strategy provides a 
reasonable basis for comparison, but just because a firm has chosen to compete within a given 
competitive marketplace does not mean the firm has aligned all of its operations to be effective 
with a given competitive environment. 
Miles and Snow (1978) describe an iterative process whereby firms adjust their focus in a 
step-by-step process over time.  This process should lead firms to make changes in all aspects of 
the business, including, but not limited to, changes in the firm’s product offerings, distribution 
system, technological inputs, communication and control processes, organizational structures, as 
well as processes that enable evolution and innovation.  Through a process of organized change 
over time the focus of the firm and the competitive strategy of the firm can more optimally align.  
The idea that alignment of the firm’s operational and organizational structures with the firm’s 
strategy will facilitate efficient operations and drive long-term success is supported by a body of 
earlier research (Drucker, 1974; Child, 1972; Perrow, 1967; Chandler, 1962).  A firm that is 
taking steps to become an Aligned Firm is pursuing the set of cause-and-effect relations, 
described by Heskett et al. (1994) which lead to more persistent earnings.  The proper focus on 
employee and customer relations, for a particular competitive strategy, will produce more 
persistent earnings as compared to a focus on employee and customer relations that is misaligned 
with the competitive strategy of the firm.  Given the broad scope of competitive strategy is seems 
that analysis between Aligned and Misaligned Firms should be performed within a given 
competitive strategy rather than between strategies.  This leads to H1, which is as follows: 
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H1: Earnings persistence is higher for Aligned Firms as compared to Misaligned 
Firms. 
The existing literature has noted several variables to be significant in considering the 
focus of a firm within its competitive surroundings.  To address the role of the contextual 
environment, this study considers the impact of these key firm characteristics.  The 
characteristics, deemed moderating variables, are as follows: firm size, the level of firm 
indebtedness, the level of firm growth, and the strength of the firm’s corporate governance.  
These additional refinements of the analysis allow for a better understanding of the underlying 
relations and for a clearer interpretation of the regression results. 
The first of these moderating variables is firm size.  Firm size is an important firm 
characteristic and has been shown to influence statistical results in countless studies across a 
wide range of relations.  As there are fundamental differences in the operations of large versus 
small firms, it is not surprising that this firm characteristic has been shown to be important in the 
analysis of a firms competitive focus (Waddock & Graves, 1997; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; 
Prior et al., 2008; Kim et al., 2012).  The market-to-book ratio is used as a proxy for growth.  
Following Kim et al. (2012), growth is included in the study due to its significance in the 
analysis of prior studies.  Leverage, or the level of firm indebtedness, has been studied as a 
possible constraint on firm spending (Barnea & Rubin, 2010); however, in this study leverage is 
used as a proxy for distressed firms.  Highly leveraged firms face additional risks, like 
continuing as a going concern, which are not an issue for firms with low levels of debt (McGuire 
et al., 1988).  Corporate governance serves as a proxy for a monitoring mechanism within the 
firm that increases the credibility of a firm’s reporting.  Kim et al. (2012) discuss the importance 
of governance as a separate construct and in their analysis they control for the impact of 
governance (Klein, 2002; Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006) rather than include it within their 
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composite score of KLD strengths and concerns.  As such, corporate governance is examined as 
a separate construct herein. 
In considering firm size, positive accounting theory (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986), 
specifically, the political cost hypothesis, suggests that large firms are subject to greater scrutiny 
than small firms and therefore larger firm are subject to higher reporting standards.  Small firms 
have a greater need to communicate information about themselves to outside parties, because 
smaller firms are less well-known.  Firms that focus on employee and customer relations are 
associated with higher visibility, stronger reputation, and higher brand recognition (Fombrun & 
Shanley, 1990; Verschoor, 2005; Linthicum et al., 2010; Mescon & Tilson, 1987; Varadarajan & 
Menon, 1988), which suggests that small firms with a focus on employee and customer relations 
have more to gain by the increased exposure than would a large firm, as the large firm is already 
well-known.  Therefore the impact of exposure related characteristics is likely to have a greater 
impact on small firms compared to large firms.  As such H2(a) is as follows: 
H2(a): The earnings persistence of small Aligned Firms should be higher as 
compared to larger firms. 
In considering the level of firm indebtedness, highly leveraged firms are more likely to be 
financially distressed and prior literature has shown management of financially distressed firms 
make decisions that impact the reported accounting fundamentals differently than their non-
financially distressed counterparts (Mercer, 2004).  Therefore financially distressed firms are 
subjected to different stimuli as compared to firms that are not financially distressed, proxied 
here as low levels of debt.  Highly leveraged firms are unlikely to fully enjoy the benefits 
typically associated with Aligned Firms, as the burden created by the debt will likely subsume 
most, if not all, of the benefit created from proper alignment.  For firms with comparatively 
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lower debt levels the benefits typically associated with Aligned Firms will not be overshadowed 
by their relatively less burdensome debt structure and therefore one would expect to see higher 
levels of earnings persistence for firms with relatively lower levels of leverage.  As such H2(b) is 
as follows: 
H2(b): The earnings persistence of Aligned Firms with low levels of indebtedness 
should be higher as compared to firms with relatively higher levels of 
indebtedness. 
In considering firm growth, firms with high levels of growth are less likely to be 
impacted by being an Aligned Firm because growth is such an important aspect of their business 
model.  Penman and Zhang (2002) point out that firm growth serves to reduce current earning by 
creating reserves on the balance sheet that make the firm’s current accounting fundamentals less 
predictive of the future.  Conversely, low growth firms are likely to be highly impacted by firm 
alignment.  For low growth firms, an investment in the firm’s employee and customer relations 
only needs to create a small impact in the firm’s earnings for the change to be detected by 
financial statement users.  Alternatively, a small change driven by these activities at a growth 
firm might simply be attributed to the firm’s growth and as such the incremental impact would 
be less detectible.  Therefore, H2(c) is as follows: 
H2(c): The earnings persistence of Aligned Firms with low levels of growth 
should be higher as compared to firms with relatively higher levels of 
growth. 
Strong corporate governance serves to inhibit managerial misconduct and adds credibility 
to other signals the firm might provide (Wu, 2012).  Therefore a strong corporate governance 
environment impacts the reporting process both directly, through the controls in place that 
govern financial reporting, and indirectly, through an environment that eschews managerial 
misconduct.  Additionally, well governed firms are more like to retain high quality auditors as 
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compared to their more poorly governed counterparts.  Regardless of the direction of this 
relation, whether well governed firms seek out high quality auditors or if it is the high quality of 
the audit that causes the firm to be well governed, these two are clearly linked.  Strong corporate 
governance seems to add validity to the actions of the firm and therefore increases the predictive 
power of the firm’s earnings and book value.  As a result H2(d) is as follows: 
H2(d): The earnings persistence of Aligned Firms with high levels of corporate 
governance should be higher as compared to firms with relatively lower 
levels of corporate governance. 
The literature provides evidence regarding the likely relation Aligned Firms have with 
earnings persistence as well as with the moderator variables, but is the relation between Aligned 
Firms and earnings persistence understood by market participants?  This question motivates my 
third hypothesis.  If Aligned Firms are associated with higher levels of earnings persistence 
investors should value the reported earnings of Aligned Firms more than those of Misaligned 
Firms.  Similarly, if Aligned Firms enjoy higher earnings persistence then by definition current 
earnings better explain next period’s earnings.  As current earnings better explain future 
earnings, the explanatory power of analysts’ forecasts must decline.  Therefore, the persistent 
earnings of Aligned Firms reduce the incremental explanatory power of analysts’ forecasts, as 
compared to Misaligned Firms, and the incremental explanatory power of analysts’ forecasts is 
predicted to be lower for Aligned Firms, relative to Misaligned Firms.   As a result H3 is 
formally stated as follows: 
H3: Market participants place more confidence in earnings and relatively less 
confidence in analysts’ forecasts for Aligned Firms as compared to 
Misaligned Firms. 
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III. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
Each hypothesis in this study addresses either directly or indirectly the relation between 
Aligned Firms and earnings persistence.  To evaluate these hypothesizes, I first determine which 
firms are Aligned and which are misaligned.  This evaluation is based on a firm’s focus on 
employee and customer relations which is operationalized using the Kinder, Lydenburg, and 
Domini (KLD) rating system.  I proxy for the quality of the firm’s employee relations using the 
KLD rating of “Employee Relations” and use KLD’s rating of “Product Quality” as a proxy for 
customer relations.  The use of “Product Quality” as a proxy for the customer’s perspective is 
supported by academic research that suggests that product quality has a significant impact on 
customer satisfaction and even delivers a greater impact than does the product’s price (Fornell et 
al., 1996).   
KLD data is often associated with corporate social responsibility and has been called the 
de facto leader in estimating a firm’s involvement in the greater good of society (Waddock, 
2003).  In this study, I use only a subset of KLD’s measures that support the set of cause-and-
effect relations described by Heskett et al. (1994).  The KLD rating system evaluates the 
performance of each firm included in the dataset across seven qualitative areas and six 
controversial business segments, assessing a rating of the firm’s strengths and concerns in each.  
If a firm is assessed by KLD to possess a strength in the qualitative area of “Employee 
Relations”, “Product Quality”, or both, I classify this firm as a Focused Firm; otherwise the firm 
is classified as a non-Focused Firm.   
I do not utilize KLD’s assessment of the controversial business segments, nor do I 
consider any assessment of concerns.  The controversial business segments are not used as they 
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are specifically designed to capture firm behavior KLD has deemed unacceptable from the 
perspective of corporate social responsibility.  As corporate social responsibility is not the focus 
of this study, KLD’s designation of a firm as being involved in a controversial business segment 
is not relevant.  KLD’s assessment of concerns is excluded in an effort to focus the study and 
limit its scope.  The prior literature includes studies that choose to net KLD strengths and 
concerns, however the creation of a composite score is not a sound theoretical decision and is not 
supported by the work of Mattingly and Berman (2006). Mattingly and Berman (2006) test the 
validity of netting KLD strengths and concerns and find the empirical results do not provide 
support for the creation of a composite score.   
To determine the classification of a firm as Aligned or Misaligned I layer the competitive 
environments discussed by Porter (1998) on top of the Focus or non-Focus of the firm.  I 
partition my data based on gross margin percentage calculated as total revenue minus cost of 
goods sold divided by total revenue.  I ordered the firms based on gross margin percentage from 
highest to lowest and assigned firms in the top quartile to the top partition (Top Partition), firms 
in the bottom quartile to the bottom partition (Bottom Partition), and the remaining two middle 
quartiles are designated as the middle partition.  Using these partitions I define Aligned and 
Misaligned Firms as follows: in the Top Partition, Aligned Firms are Focused Firms, and 
Misaligned Firms are non-Focused Firms; in the Bottom Partition, Aligned Firms are non-
Focused Firms and Misaligned Firms are Focused Firms, as described in Figure 1.  According to 
Porter (1998) the Top Partition includes the differentiators who earn a relatively high gross 
margin by creating the perception of uniqueness with their product offerings.  Therefore these 
firms should be focused on employee and customer relations in an effort to develop this 
perception of uniqueness.  The Bottom Partition, on the other hand, contains firms Porter (1998) 
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describes as cost leaders.  These firms maintain their competitive advantage through careful cost 
management, and as such, a focus on employee and customer relations would be viewed as an 
additional cost layer for the cost leader.  Therefore cost leaders should not focus the firm’s 
resources on developing strong employee and customer relations. 
  
Top Partition 
(Top 25% GM) 
 
 
Bottom Partition 
(Bottom 25% GM) 
 
Focused Firms 
 
 
Aligned Firms 
 
Misaligned Firms 
 
Non-Focused Firms 
 
 
Misaligned Firms 
 
Aligned Firms 
 
Figure 1 
Definition of Aligned and Misaligned Firms 
 
The literature indicates that certain firm characteristics are likely to influence the relation 
between Aligned Firms and earnings persistence.  As such the analysis is structured to consider 
the influence of these specific firm characteristics, deemed moderator variables.  To investigate 
the impact of these moderators (H2), I use an additional partition of the data based on the relative 
magnitude of the moderator within the distribution.  The moderator variables are indicator 
variables, and therefore the partition in the data is formed between the top 50% of the 
distribution versus the bottom 50% of the distribution within the sample. 
The moderating variables are defined as follows: firm size, leverage, growth, and 
corporate governance.  The proxy for Firm Size (Sizei,t) is an indicator variable having a value of 
one if the natural logarithm of the market value of equity is smaller than the median for the 
sample and zero otherwise for firm i at time t.  The proxy for Leverage (Levi,t) is an indicator 
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variable having a value of one if long-term debt scaled by total assets is larger than the median 
for the sample and zero otherwise for firm i at time t.  The proxy for Growth (MBi,t) is an 
indicator variable having a value of one if the market-to-book equity ratio is larger than the 
median for the sample and zero otherwise, where the market-to-book equity ratio is calculated as 
the market value of equity over book value of equity for firm i at time t.  The proxy for 
Corporate governance (Govi,t) is an indicator variable having a value of one if the net KLD rating 
for corporate governance, measured as the number of strengths minus the number of concerns is 
greater than zero and zero otherwise for firm i at time t.   
The window of time covered by this study was impacted by the implementation of 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 142 which went into effect for all fiscal years 
beginning after December 15
th
, 2001.  This standard addresses the accounting for goodwill and 
other intangibles. Positive employee and customer relations is not typically captured by 
accounting, however; should a firm record goodwill, positive employee and customer relations 
would be capitalized onto the firms balance sheet.  As the implementation of the standard would 
change the only way employee and customer relations is directly recorded into the accounting 
records the sample period was restricted, such that all observations included in the sample would 
fall under the same regulatory guidance.   
The sample began with all firms listed in the Compustat database during the sample 
window.  This provided an initial sample of 146,523 firm-years.  As Table 1 shows, 59,045 firm-
year observations were lost due to missing Compustat data.  An additional 15,473 observations 
were deleted as they were related to financial industry firms and the definition of key financial 
metrics is different for financial firms.  Due to a lack of data needed to calculate the necessary 
lagged variables, 17,276 observations were deleted.  The merge with the KLD dataset reduced 
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the sample by an additional 37,024 firm-years, and 8,853 observations were lost as they were 
classified as “caught in the middle”.  This resulted in the full sample consisting of 2,165 firms  
TABLE 1 
Sample Selection 
 
Description 
 Firm-year 
Observations 
 
Firm-years list on Compustat for the sample period 
           
146,523 
    
 
Less: Firm-years with missing Compustat data  
            
59,045  
    
 
Less: Firm-years associated with financial firms  
            
15,473  
    
 
Less: Firm-years lacking the necessary lagged variables  
            
17,276  
    
 
Less: Firm-years missing KLD data  
            
37,024  
    
  
Less: Firm-years from the middle partition, "caught in the middle"               8,853  
    
 
Full Sample consisting of 2,165 firms from 2002 to 2011 
 
           8,852 
    
  
Less: Firm-years with missing IBES data               3,665  
    
  
Less: Firm-years with missing CRSP data                  457  
    
  
Less: Firm-years missing the necessary variables               1,579  
 
 
Reduced Sample consisting of 648 firms from 2002 to 2011 
  
 
3,151 
    
 
covering 8,852 firm-years.  To test the market’s reaction to the relation between earnings 
persistence and firm alignment, additional restrictions had to be placed on the data.  The merge 
of the sample with the IBES database reduced the number of usable observation by another 
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3,665, and 457 more firm-year observations were lost due to the merge with the CRSP dataset.  
An additional 1,579 firm-year observation were deleted as they were missing the necessary 
variables to conduct the analysis, bringing the final sample to 3,151 firm-year observations for 
648 firms covering the period from 2002 to 2011. The continuous variables for all observations 
were winzorized at the one-percent level. 
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IV. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The study’s design rests upon the relation between the firm alignment and earnings 
persistence.  Because Focused Firms include a focus on either employee, customer relations, or 
both, I begin the analysis with each run separately and then progress to the base model, first 
without controls and then adding the controls from prior literature as well as industry and year 
dummy variables.  The full model, including all controls, is presented below: 
Ei,t+1 = α0 + α1Ei,t + α2Aligni,t + α3(Ei,t*Aligni,t) +α4LgSIi,t +α5Lossi,t + α6Intgblei,t 
+ α7Agei,t + α8Repi,t + α9R&Di,t + α10Advi,t + αiInd_Dummiesi,t + 
αjYr_Dummiesi,t +  ε1i,t              (1) 
 
where Ei,t is income before extraordinary items but includes special items, defined as net income 
plus discontinued operations and income taxes all scaled by total assets for firm i at time t, and 
Aligni,t is an indicator variable having the value of one if the firm is an Aligned Firm and a zero 
otherwise for firm i at time t, LgSIi,t is an indicator variable having the value of one for firms 
with large special items and zero otherwise, where large special items is defined as total special 
items that exceed 1% of average total assets following Elliott and Shaw (1988) for firm i at time 
t, Lossi,t is an indicator variable having the value of one for firms with net income that is less 
than zero and a zero otherwise for firm i at time t, Intgblei,t is an indicator variable having the 
value of one for firms with intangible assets that are greater than zero and a zero otherwise for 
firm i at time t, Agei,t is an indicator variable having a value of one if firm age is greater than the 
sample median and a zero otherwise, where firm age (Age1) is the sum of the number of years 
since firm i was first listed on Compustat at time t, Repi,t is reputation and is an indicator variable 
having the value of one if firm i is on Fortune’s America’s Most Admired Companies list and a 
zero otherwise at time t, R&Di,t is an indicator variable having the value of one if the firm’s 
research and development expense is greater than zero and a zero otherwise where research and 
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development expense (R&D1) is calculated as research and development expense divided by net 
sales for firm i at time t, Advi,t is an indicator variable having the value of one if advertising 
expense was greater than zero and a zero otherwise, where advertising expense (Adv1) is 
calculated as advertising expense divided by net sales for firm i at time t, Ind_Dummiesi,t is an 
indicator variable having the value of one if the firm is included in the industry portfolio and a 
zero otherwise, where the industry portfolios is one of the twelve Fama French industry 
portfolios defined by SIC code, and Yr_Dummiesi,t is an indicator variable having the value of 
one if the observation is for the given year and a zero otherwise.
1
 
Additional analysis is conducted by examining the impact of the moderators on the 
relation between earnings persistence and alignment.  To conduct this analysis the data is parsed 
between Top and Bottom Partitions and then within each partition the data is further parsed into 
Aligned and Misaligned Firms.  Within these partitions the relation of interest is the interaction 
between earnings and the moderator.  The full model, including all controls, is presented below: 
Ei,t+1 = β0 + β1Ei,t + β2Moderatori,t + β3(Ei,t*Moderatori,t) + β4LgSIi,t + β5Lossi,t + 
β6Intgblei,t + β7Agei,t + β8Repi,t + β9R&Di,t + β10Advi,t + βiInd_Dummiesi,t 
+ βjYr_Dummiesi,t + ε2i,t              (2) 
 
where Moderatori,t is one of the following: Largei,t, Levi,t, MBi,t, or Govi,t and all other variables 
are as previously defined.   
To examine the market’s reaction to the relation between alignment and earnings 
persistence I conduct an analysis of the incremental explanatory power of earnings and analysts’ 
forecasts.  Because Aligned Firms should enjoy greater earnings persistence, Aligned Firms 
should have lower incremental explanatory power from analysts’ forecasts as related to future 
                                                          
1
 The work of Chiu and Sharfman (2011) and Torelli et al. (2012) among others suggest that firm visibility is a 
control that should be considered in this analysis.  Therefore, I initially included visibility as a control variable in the 
analysis and found it to be insignificant, as such; firm visibility was dropped from the analysis. 
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earnings.  To test this expectation, I follow a methodology used by Collins et al. (1997), and 
created three versions of the full model presented below: 
Pricei,t = λ0 + λ1Ei,t +  λ2           
    + λ3LgSIi,t + λ4Lossi,t + λ5Intgblei,t + λ6Agei,t 
+ λ7Repi,t + λ8R&Di,t + λ9Advi,t + λiInd_Dummiesi,t + λjYr_Dummiesi,t + 
ε3i,t                       (3) 
 
where Pricei,t is the closing price on the last day of the fiscal year for firm i at time t, Forecasti,t
t-1
 
is the first consensus analysts’ forecasts provided after the prior year’s announcement for the 
current year end for firm i at time t, and all other variables are as previously defined.  I first run 
Eq. (3) excluding Forecasti,t
t-1
.  I then run Eq. (3) excluding Ei,t.  The final step is to run Eq. (3) in 
its full model form as presented above.  By subtracting the R
2
 of the first version of Eq. (3) from 
the R
2
 of the full model of Eq. (3) the resulting difference is the incremental predictive power 
provided by analysts’ forecasts.  This difference indicates the ability of analysts’ forecasts to 
explain next period’s price beyond the explanation provided by earnings.  As stated in H3, I 
expect Aligned Firms to demonstrate relatively stronger earnings persistence; therefore, the 
incremental explanatory power of analysts’ forecasts will be relatively weak. 
To further test the market’s understanding of the relation between alignment and earnings 
persistence I test the incremental impact of Aligned Firms on the relation between abnormal 
return and unexpected earnings.  This test is conducted following the model used by Freeman 
and Tse (1989) presented below: 
AbReti,t = ω0 + ω1UEi,t + ω2Aligni,t + ω3(UEi,t*Aligni,t) + ω4FirmSizei,t + ω5Lossi,t 
+ ω6Betai,t + ω7DtoEi,t + ω8Analystsi,t + ε4i,t           (4) 
 
where AbReti,t is the daily compounded return from one day after the prior periods 
announcement date to one day after the current period’s announcement date less the mean return 
from the firm’s Scholes-Williams (1977) beta decile for firm i at time t, UEi,t is unexpected 
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earnings calculated as current period earnings less the first consensus analysts’ forecasts 
provided after the prior year’s announcement for the current year end for firm i at time t, 
FirmSizei,t is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity for firm i at time t, Betai,t is the 
firm beta as defined by Scholes-Williams (1977) for firm i at time t, DtoEi,t is the debt to equity 
ratio, calculated as total debt divided by total equity for firm i at time t, Anlaystsi,t is the number 
of analysts following the firm as reported by IBES for firm i at time t, and all other variables are 
as previously defined.  In addition to calculating abnormal return following Freeman and Tse 
(1989), the analysis was also conducted following the definition of abnormal return used by  
Abarbanell and Bushee (1998), where abnormal return is the daily compounded return as defined 
before less the mean daily compounded return from the value-weighted firm size decile for firm i 
at time t. 
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V. RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics related to the full sample are presented in Table 2 Panel A.  In  
TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Full Sample 
      
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Min 25
th
 % 75
th
 % Max 
Ei,t 0.012 0.041 0.150 -0.650 0.000 0.083 0.260 
Ei,t+1 0.008 0.042 0.156 -0.693 -0.001 0.082 0.254 
LgSIi,t 0.078 0.000  0.269 0.000  0.000 0.000 1.000 
Lossi,t 0.183 0.000 0.386 0.000  0.000 0.000 1.000 
Intgblei,t 0.808 1.000 0.394 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Age1i,t 21.970 15.000 16.331 1.000 9.000 32.000 61.000 
Repi,t 0.105 0.000 0.307 0.000   0.000 0.000   1.000 
R&D1i,t 0.332 0.000 1.549 0.000  0.000 0.091  12.189  
Adv1i,t 0.014 0.000 0.035 0.000  0.000 0.009 0.239 
Sizei,t 7.085 6.879 1.560 4.065 5.949 8.007 11.448 
Levi,t 0.168 0.134 0.171 0.000 0.001 0.277 0.660 
MBi,t 3.397 2.320 3.335 0.489 1.476 3.941 20.160 
Govi,t 0.115 0.000 0.319 0.000 0.000  0.000 1.000 
 
Panel B: Partitioned Sample 
     
 Top Partition   Bottom Partition   
Variable Mean Median Std Dev  Mean Median Std Dev  
Ei,t 0.057 0.061 0.107  -0.033 0.027 0.172  
Ei,t+1 0.048 0.059 0.120  -0.031 0.030 0.178  
LgSIi,t 0.073 0.000   0.261  0.083 0.000 0.276  
Lossi,t 0.107 0.000 0.309  0.258 0.000 0.438  
Intgblei,t 0.812 1.000 0.391  0.805 1.000 0.396  
Age1i,t 20.559 15.000 15.540  23.380 16.000 16.968  
Repi,t 0.089 0.000 0.285  0.121 0.000 0.326  
R&D1i,t 0.096 0.012 0.355  0.567 0.000 2.135  
Adv1i,t 0.023 0.003 0.044  0.005 0.000 0.020  
Sizei,t 7.347 7.150 1.598  6.824 6.622 1.476  
Levi,t 0.153 0.097 0.175  0.182 0.159 0.166  
MBi,t 4.023 2.935 3.559  2.771 1.875 2.966  
Govi,t 0.128 0.000 0.334  0.102 0.000 0.303  
The full sample consists of 8,852 firm-year observations for 2,165 firms covering the period from 2002-2011.  
The Top Partition consists of 4,423 firm-year observations while the Bottom Partition consists of 4,429 firm-
year observations. 
Ei,t is income before extraordinary items but including special items defined as net income plus discontinued 
operations and income taxes all scaled by total assets for firm i at time t.  
LgSIi,t is an indicator variable that is one for firms with large special items and zero otherwise, where large 
special items is defined as total special items that exceed 1% of average total assets for firm i at time t 
Lossi,t is an indicator variable that is one for firms with net income that is less than zero and a zero otherwise  
for firm i at time t. 
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(Table 2 continued) 
Intgblei,t is an indicator variable that is one for firms with intangible assets that are greater than zero and a zero 
otherwise for firm i at time t.  
Age1i,t is a sum of the number of years since the firm was first listed on Compustat for firm i at time t. 
Repi,t is reputation and is an indicator variable of one if the firm is on Fortune’s America’s Most Admired 
Companies list and a zero otherwise for firm i at time t. 
R&D1i,t is calculated as research and development expense divided by net sales for firm i at time t. 
Adv1i,t is calculated as advertising expense divided by net sales for firm i at time t. 
Sizei,t is an indicator variable having a value of one if the natural logarithm of the market value of equity is 
smaller than the median and zero otherwise for firm i at time t. 
Levi,t is an indicator variable having a value of one if long-term debt scaled by total assets is smaller than the 
median and zero otherwise for firm i at time t. 
MBi,t is an indicator variable having a value of one if the market-to-book equity ratio is smaller than the median 
and zero otherwise, where the market-to-book equity ratio is calculated as the market value of equity 
over book value of equity for firm i at time t. 
Govi,t is the net KLD rating for corporate governance, measured as the number of strengths minus the number 
of concerns for firm i at time t. 
 
general, I find no unexpected anomalies in the data and the variables appear to be consistent with 
extant literature.  Almost 8% of the firm-year observations included a large special item with 
over 18% of the observations being periods where the firm experienced a loss.  The sample tends 
to be composed of mature firms with an average age of almost 22 years, which is consistent with 
Kim et al. (2012).  However, the mean for firm age is somewhat inflated by very mature firms as 
the median age in the sample is somewhat less at only 15 years.  As captured by Repi,t, over 10% 
of the sample is listed on Fortune’s “America’s Most Admired Companies” list. Research and 
development costs with a mean of 0.332 are slightly higher as compared to the sample examined 
by Kim et al. (2012), while advertising expenses with a mean of 0.014 are slightly lower than 
this previous study.  The size of the firms in the sample tends to be quite large, even slightly 
larger than the firms considered by Kim et al. (2012).  Large firms are expected in this sample as 
firm size is a characteristic used in KLD’s selection process.  In considering Levi,t and MBi,t the 
mean of both appear reasonable in comparison to the levels reported by Kim et al. (2012).  
Additionally, in untabulated results, Aligned Firms make up just over 52% of the sample. 
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Panel B, Table 2, presents comparative descriptive statistics between the Top and Bottom 
Partitions which are based on gross margin percentage.  The Top Partition consists of 4,423 firm-
year observations while the Bottom Partition includes 4,429 firm-years.  Firms in the Top 
Partition, on average, exhibit higher current period earnings (Ei,t), which seems reasonable given 
the partition is based on gross margin percentage.  In untabulated results, the Top Partition is 
composed of 24.7% Aligned Firms while the Bottom Partition contains 79.4% Aligned Firms.  
Top Partition firms also tend to be younger, by more than three years, are less well-known as 
captured by the reputation variable, spend more on research and development and advertising, 
and have higher levels of growth, than their bottom partition counterparts.  However the strength 
of the corporate governance environment is statistically the same between the partitions. 
I present the Pearson correlations above the diagonal and the Spearman correlations 
below the diagonal, in Table 3.  Ei,t is highly positively correlated with Ei,t+1, and negatively 
correlated with Lossi,t, at statistically significant levels.  Aligni,t is positively correlated with Ei,t 
as well as Lossi,t, Intgblei,t, Age1i,t, Repi,t, and Levi,t, but negatively correlated with Ei,t+1, LgSIi,t, 
R&D1i,t, Adv1i,t, Sizei,t, MBi,t, and Govi,t.  Interestingly, Table 3  indicates that firm size is not 
correlated with the level of either research and development expense or advertising expense 
based on the Pearson correlations but are statistically significant following the Spearman 
correlation. 
Table 4 presents the results of the multivariate regression analysis of the relation between 
earnings persistence and firm alignment, partitioned based on the magnitude of the firm’s gross 
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TABLE 3 
Correlation Matrix - Pearson (above diagonal) and Spearman (below diagonal) - (p-values shown in italics below correlation) 
               
 Ei,t Ei,t+1 Aligni,t LgSIi,t Lossi,t Intgblei,t Age1i,t Repi,t R&D1i,t Adv1i,t Sizei,t Levi,t MBi,t Govi,t 
Ei,t 1.000 0.714 0.171 0.016 -0.687 0.192 0.160 0.126 -0.5307 0.0599 0.366 -0.041 -0.041 0.012 
   <.0001 <.0001 0.1390 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.2651 
Ei,t+1 0.716 1.000 -0.147 -0.036 -0.571 0.189 0.167 0.128 -0.5199 0.0543 0.349 0.001 0.031 0.012 
  <.0001  <.0001 0.0008 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.9268 0.004 0.2461 
Aligni,t 0.160 -0.128 1.000 -0.016 0.106 0.040 0.049 0.047 0.1154 -0.1475 -0.023 0.031 -0.076 -0.019 
  <.0001 <.0001  0.1343 <.0001 0.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0321 0.0033 <.0001 0.0813 
LgSIi,t 0.018 -0.027 -0.016 1.000 0.060 -0.064 -0.097 -0.042 0.0512 0.0033 -0.061 0.028 0.084 -0.021 
  0.0828 0.0121 0.1343  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.7549 <.0001 0.0092 <.0001 0.0537 
Lossi,t -0.621 -0.494 0.106 0.060 1.000 -0.253 -0.191 -0.135 0.3995 -0.0315 -0.338 -0.099 0.096 0.011 
  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0031 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.2844 
Intgblei,t 0.106 0.104 0.040 -0.064 -0.253 1.000 0.106 0.130 -0.2102 0.0104 0.205 0.104 -0.104 -0.025 
  <.0001 <.0001 0.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.3276 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0205 
Age1i,t 0.137 0.144 0.060 -0.147 -0.199 0.101 1.000 0.289 -0.1497 -0.0707 0.389 0.111 -0.120 0.004 
  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.7315 
Repi,t 0.157 0.154 0.047 -0.042 -0.135 0.130 0.266 1.000 -0.0667 0.0269 0.508 0.020 0.037 -0.001 
  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 0.0114 <.0001 0.0583 0.0005 0.9258 
R&D1i,t -0.1685 -0.1453 -0.0161 0.0191 0.3657 -0.0263 -0.1747 -0.0598 1.0000 -0.0334 -0.1524 -0.0770 0.1487 0.0005 
  <.0001 <.0001 0.1294 0.0721 <.0001 0.0134 <.0001 <.0001  0.0017 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.9655 
Adv1i,t 0.1619 0.1502 -0.1814 -0.0271 -0.0927 0.0916 -0.0486 0.0231 0.0206 1.0000 0.0498 -0.0762 0.1264 0.0316 
  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0108 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0297 0.0529  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0029 
Sizei,t 0.407 0.401 -0.046 -0.065 -0.355 0.213 0.334 0.428 -0.0635 0.0615 1.000 0.073 0.174 -0.062 
  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Levi,t -0.175 -0.140 0.054 0.012 -0.139 0.139 0.166 0.067 -0.3158 -0.0952 0.159 1.000 0.018 -0.081 
  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.2737 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  0.0841 <.0001 
MBi,t 0.313 0.346 -0.112 0.053 0.020 -0.087 -0.146 0.071 0.3072 0.1240 0.301 -0.141 1.000 0.013 
  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0631 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  0.2118 
Govi,t 0.032 0.022 -0.019 -0.021 0.011 -0.025 -0.012 -0.001 -0.0091 0.0041 -0.093 -0.088 0.029 1.000 
 0.0026 0.0368 0.0813 0.0537 0.2844 0.0205 0.2399 0.9258 0.3931 0.6969 <.0001 <.0001 0.0067  
The full sample consists of 8,852 firm-year observations for 2,165 firms covering the period from 2002-2011. 
Ei,t is income before extraordinary items but including special items defined as net income plus discontinued operations and income taxes all 
scaled by total assets for firm i at time t.  
Aligni,t is an indicator variable having the value of one if the firm is an Aligned Firm and a zero otherwise for firm i at time t. 
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(Table 3 continued) 
LgSIi,t is an indicator variable that is one for firms with large special items and zero otherwise, where large special items is defined as total 
special items that exceed 1% of average total assets for firm i at time t. 
Lossi,t is an indicator variable that is one for firms with net income that is less than zero and a zero otherwise  for firm i at time t. 
Intgblei,t is an indicator variable that is one for firms with intangible assets that are greater than zero and a zero otherwise for firm i at time t.  
Age1i,t is a sum of the number of years since the firm was first listed on Compustat for firm i at time t. 
Repi,t is reputation and is an indicator variable of one if the firm is on Fortune’s America’s Most Admired Companies list and a zero otherwise 
for firm i at time t. 
R&D1i,t is calculated as research and development expense divided by net sales for firm i at time t. 
Adv1i,t is calculated as advertising expense divided by net sales for firm i at time t. 
Sizei,t is an indicator variable having a value of one if the natural logarithm of the market value of equity is smaller than the median and zero 
otherwise for firm i at time t. 
Levi,t is an indicator variable having a value of one if long-term debt scaled by total assets is smaller than the median and zero otherwise for 
firm i at time t. 
MBi,t is an indicator variable having a value of one if the market-to-book equity ratio is smaller than the median and zero otherwise, where the 
market-to-book equity ratio is calculated as the market value of equity over book value of equity for firm i at time t. 
Govi,t is the net KLD rating for corporate governance, measured as the number of strengths minus the number of concerns for firm i at time t. 
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TABLE 4 
Tests of the persistence of earnings 
 
Ei,t+1 = α0 + α1Ei,t + α2Aligni,t + α3(Ei,t*Aligni,t) + α4LgSIi,t + α5Lossi,t + α6Intgblei,t + α7Agei,t + α8Repi,t + α9R&Di,t + α10Advi,t + 
αiInd_Dummyi,t + αjYr_Dummyi,t + ε1i,t 
                  
 Top Partition (Top 25% GM)   Bottom Partition (Bottom 25% GM) 
 Employee  Customer  Either  Either   Employee  Customer  Either  Either  
Intercept 0.025 *** 0.025 *** 0.009 *** 0.025 ***   0.023 ** 0.015   0.007 * 0.021 ** 
Ei,t 0.562 *** 0.561 *** 0.632 *** 0.553 ***   0.502 *** 0.598 *** 0.679 *** 0.507 *** 
Aligni,t 0.006 * -0.007   0.006   0.004     -0.010 * -0.001   -0.015 *** -0.008 * 
Ei,t*Aligni,t 0.004   0.106   0.080 ** 0.073 *   0.080 *** -0.026   0.099 *** 0.077 *** 
LgSIi,t -0.005   -0.006      -0.005     -0.017 *** -0.017 ***    -0.017 *** 
Lossi,t -0.044 *** -0.044 ***    -0.044 ***   -0.054 *** -0.054 ***    -0.054 *** 
Intgblei,t -0.005   -0.004      -0.005     0.010 ** 0.010 **    0.010 ** 
Agei,t 0.005   0.006 *    0.005     0.013 *** 0.013 ***    0.013 *** 
Repi,t 0.014 ** 0.018 ***    0.014 **   0.009   0.009 *    0.008   
R&Di,t -0.001   0.000      -0.001     -0.029 *** -0.029 ***    -0.028 *** 
Advi,t 0.005   0.005      0.005 *   0.002   0.002      0.002   
Includes industry and year dummies             
N       4,423          4,423     4,423     4,423            4,429          4,429     4,429     4,429    
Adj R
2
 0.3743   0.3737   0.3378   0.3520     0.6055   0.6044   0.5494   0.6055   
The full sample consists of 8,852 firm-year observations for 2,165 firms covering the period from 2002-2011, and *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively.  
Ei,t is income before extraordinary items but including special items defined as net income plus discontinued operations and income taxes 
all scaled by total assets for firm i at time t.  
Aligni,t is an indicator variable having the value of one if the firm is an Aligned Firm and a zero otherwise for firm i at time t. 
LgSIi,t is an indicator variable that is one for firms with large special items and zero otherwise, where large special items is defined as total 
special items that exceed 1% of average total assets for firm i at time t. 
Lossi,t is an indicator variable that is one for firms with net income that is less than zero and a zero otherwise  for firm i at time t. 
Intgblei,t is an indicator variable of one for firms with intangible assets that are greater than zero and a zero otherwise for firm i at time t.  
Agei,t is a sum of the number of years since the firm was first listed on Compustat for firm i at time t. 
Repi,t is an indicator variable of one for firms on Fortune’s America’s Most Admired Companies list and zero otherwise for firm i at time t. 
R&Di,t is an indicator variable having the value of one if the firm’s research and development expense is greater than zero and a zero 
otherwise firm i at time t. 
Advi,t is an indicator variable of one if the firm’s advertising expense is greater than zero and a zero otherwise for firm i at time t. 
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margin percentage.  The table includes analysis for firms with a focus on employee relations, 
customer relations, as well as either employee or customer relations.  The data was run 
separately for employee and customer relations to ensure that combining the two together did not 
produce an anomalous result.  In Table 4 the relation of interest is the interaction between 
earnings and alignment (Ei,t*Aligni,t).  In the Top Partition the interaction term is 0.004 and 
0.106 for employees and customers, respectively, and both are statistically insignificant.  In the 
Bottom Partition the interaction term for employees is 0.080 and is statistically significant while 
the interaction term for customers is -0.026 but statistically insignificant.  After considering both 
the statistical significance of these coefficients and their sign I concluded that it was reasonable 
to conduct the remaining analysis by considering firms focused on either employee relations, 
customer relations, or both. 
H1 predicts that in both the Top Partition and in the Bottom Partition, Aligned Firms will 
have more persistent earnings than Misaligned Firms.  For both partitions H1 is supported.  In 
the Top Partition the support for H1 is somewhat weak, and appears to be impacted by the 
inclusion of the controls, with an interaction term of 0.073 that is significant at the 10% level.  In 
the Bottom Partition the support for H1 is strong, with an interaction term of 0.077 that is 
significant at the 1% level.  The stronger relation associated with the Bottom Partition, or the 
cost leaders, seems reasonable in that cost leaders are highly focused on costs.  For a firm in the 
Bottom Partition, allocating the firm’s resources to initiatives that promote strong employee and 
customer relations effectively creates an additional cost layer for the firm.  Such actions work 
directly contrary to the competitive strategy of the firm.  Therefore the need to maintain 
alignment between the firm’s competitive strategy and the firm’s operational decisions is critical 
for the cost leader.  For firms in the Top Partition, or differentiators, a lack of focus on employee 
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or customer relations might not create a direct impact to the firm in the short run.  Additionally, 
due to the relatively high gross margin enjoyed by firms in the Top Partition, these firms have 
added flexibility in their operational choices.  This flexibility is likely to lead firms in the Top 
Partition to try “new” approaches from time to time.  As with anything, some of these changes 
will be successful but others will not.  This flexibility with mixed results could partially explain 
the weaker results for the Top Partition.  However, when viewed as a whole, these results 
support H1, Aligned Firms are associated with relatively higher levels of earnings persistence. 
In an effort to ensure that alignment was critical I also examined the relation between 
firms that simply focused on employee or customer relations, without regard to whether this 
focus created alignment with the firm’s competitive strategy or not (Focused Firms).  In 
untablulated results, I interact Focused Firms with earnings and estimate the coefficients.  This 
interaction results in a negative and significant coefficient which suggests that firms that are not 
Focused Firms would enjoy higher earnings persistence as compared to Focused Firms.  This 
finding supports the position that focusing on employee and customer relations is not enough.  
For a firm to reap the benefits of focus on employee and customer relations, that focus needs to 
align with the firm’s competitive strategy or else the firm’s action may serve to hinder earnings 
persistence. 
The alignment of a firm’s focus on its employee and customer relations is different in 
each classification of competitive strategy.  A focus on the firm’s employee and customer 
relations would align with the competitive strategy of a differentiator.  Here the firm has chosen 
to position itself to provide a unique product and charge a relatively higher price for the product.  
To follow this strategy the firm needs for its customers to be highly satisfied with the product 
offering.  For a firm following a cost leadership strategy, employee and customer relations are of 
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less importance with the emphasis being placed on lowering costs.  Under this competitive 
strategy fostering strong employee and customer relations creates an additional layer of expense 
within the firm’s cost structure and therefore constitutes a misalignment from the firm’s chosen 
competitive strategy.  Porter (1998) argues that competitive strategies are not absolute in that 
differentiators must consider cost impacts and cost leaders must maintain some level of product 
quality.  Likewise firm alignment or misalignment between the firm’s focus on its employee and 
customer and its chosen competitive strategy is also relative to one another and not absolute, but 
the results suggest that alignment is critical in understanding the persistence of earnings. 
Table 5 presents the results of the interaction between earnings and the moderators for 
both the Top and Bottom Partition.  The relation between alignment and earnings persistence is 
further explored by examining the impact of four firm characteristics, termed moderators, which 
the extant literature suggests are worthy of consideration within this setting.  Specifically, these 
four firm characteristics are firm size, the level of firm indebtedness, firm growth, and the 
strength of the firm’s corporate governance.  In this analysis the relation of interest is the 
interaction term between earnings and the moderator.  Therefore the predictions for H2(a) thru 
H2(d) will be evaluated based on this coefficient (β3).    
The results for the first moderator examined, firm size, are presented in Table 5 Panel A.  
H2(a) states that small firms are most likely to benefit from being an Aligned Firm.  The 
hypothesis suggests that the incremental effect of firm size on earnings persistence will be 
strongest for small, Aligned Firms.  However the results suggest that firm size is not a significant 
factor.  The difference between Aligned and Misaligned Firms in the Top and Bottom Partition is 
0.075 and -0.026, respectively and both are statistically insignificant.  The results in Panel A do  
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TABLE 5 
Tests of the persistence of earnings for moderator variables 
 
Ei,t+1 = β0 + β1Ei,t + β2Moderatori,t + β3(Ei,t*Moderatori,t) + β4LgSIi,t + β5Lossi,t + β6Intgblei,t +  β7Agei,t + β8Repi,t + β9R&Di,t + β10Advi,t 
+ βiInd_Dummyi,t + βjYr_Dummyi,t + ε2i,t 
 
Panel A:Firm Size 
 Top Partition (Top 25% GM)  Bottom Partition (Bottom 25% GM) 
 Aligned  Misaligned  Difference  Aligned  Misaligned  Difference 
Intercept -0.022   0.022 **  -0.044 **  0.003   0.040 **  -0.037 * 
Ei,t 0.583 ***  0.522 ***  0.061   0.585 ***  0.554 ***  0.031   
Sizei,t 0.030 ***  0.027 ***  0.003   0.026 ***  0.025 ***  0.002   
Ei,t*Sizei,t 0.085   0.009   0.075   -0.184 ***  -0.158 ***  -0.026   
LgSIi,t -0.009   -0.004   -0.005   -0.012   -0.025 **  0.013   
Lossi,t -0.008   -0.043 ***  0.035 **  -0.062 ***  -0.026 **  -0.036 *** 
Intgblei,t 0.009   -0.012 ***  0.021 **  0.010 *  -0.017 *  0.027 ** 
Agei,t 0.002   0.001   0.001   0.011 ***  -0.001   0.012   
Repi,t 0.004   0.004   0.001   -0.005   0.014 *  -0.019   
R&Di,t 0.006   -0.003   0.009   -0.030 ***  -0.019 **  -0.011   
Advi,t 0.005   0.005   -0.001   0.001   -0.002   0.002   
Includes industry and year dummies 
N 1,094   3,329      3,516   913     
Adj R
2
 0.3693   0.3811      0.6120   0.5920         
 
Panel B:Leverage 
 Top Partition (Top 25% GM)  Bottom Partition (Bottom 25% GM) 
 Aligned  Misaligned  Difference  Aligned  Misaligned  Difference 
Intercept -0.005   0.029 ***  -0.034 *  0.010   0.056 ***  -0.046 ** 
Ei,t 0.692 ***  0.586 ***  0.105 **  0.625 ***  0.545 ***  0.080 ** 
Levi,t -0.003   0.003   -0.006   0.003   -0.016 **  0.019 ** 
Ei,t*Levi,t -0.037   -0.156 ***  0.119   -0.172 ***  -0.035   -0.136 *** 
LgSIi,t -0.008   -0.004   -0.003   -0.012 *  -0.026 **  0.014   
Lossi,t -0.013   -0.046 ***  0.033 **  -0.062 ***  -0.023 **  -0.040 *** 
Intgblei,t 0.014   -0.007   0.021 **  0.012 **  -0.008   0.020 * 
Agei,t 0.005   0.005   0.000   0.014 ***  0.002   0.011   
Repi,t 0.010 *  0.018 *  -0.008   0.005   0.017 **  -0.012   
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(Table 5 continued)                
 Top Partition (Top 25% GM)  Bottom Partition (Bottom 25% GM) 
 Aligned  Misaligned  Difference  Aligned  Misaligned  Difference 
R&Di,t 0.007   -0.001   0.008   -0.029 ***  -0.023 ***  -0.006   
Advi,t 0.006   0.004   0.002   0.001   -0.001   0.003   
Includes industry and year dummies 
N 1094   3329      3516   913     
Adj R
2
 0.3578     0.3748           0.6114     0.5857         
 
Panel C:Growth 
 Top Partition (Top 25% GM)  Bottom Partition (Bottom 25% GM) 
 Aligned  Misaligned  Difference  Aligned  Misaligned  Difference 
Intercept -0.035 **  0.015   -0.050 ***  0.004   0.032 *  -0.028   
Ei,t 0.541 ***  0.351 ***  0.190 **  0.424 ***  0.444 ***  -0.020   
MBi,t 0.044 ***  0.028 ***  0.016 **  0.025 ***  0.036 ***  -0.011   
Ei,t*MBi,t 0.087   0.213 ***  -0.126   0.222 ***  0.140 ***  0.082   
LgSIi,t -0.006   -0.004   -0.002   -0.012 *  -0.029 **  0.017   
Lossi,t -0.013   -0.050 ***  0.038 ***  -0.067 ***  -0.024 **  -0.044 *** 
Intgblei,t 0.021 **  -0.006   0.027 ***  0.013 **  -0.005   0.018   
Agei,t 0.003   0.008 **  -0.006   0.017 ***  0.003   0.014   
Repi,t 0.005   0.007   -0.003   0.001   0.011   -0.011   
R&Di,t 0.003   -0.006   0.009   -0.030 ***  -0.023 ***  -0.007   
Advi,t 0.004   0.003   0.001   0.001   0.000   0.001   
Includes industry and year dummies 
N 1094   3329      3516   913     
Adj R
2
 0.3918     0.3941           0.6164     0.6014         
              
Panel D: Governance 
 Top Partition (Top 25% GM)  Bottom Partition (Bottom 25% GM) 
 Aligned  Misaligned  Difference  Aligned  Misaligned  Difference 
Intercept -0.004   0.031 ***  -0.035 *  0.008   0.047 ***  -0.039 ** 
Ei,t 0.678 ***  0.552 ***  0.126 ***  0.568 ***  0.555 ***  0.013   
Govi,t -0.010   0.011 *  -0.021   0.007   -0.008   0.015   
Ei,t*Govi,t 0.096   -0.072 *  0.168   0.048   -0.116 *  0.164 ** 
LgSIi,t -0.009   -0.005   -0.004   -0.013 *  -0.029 **  0.017   
Lossi,t -0.013   -0.049 ***  0.036 **  -0.060 ***  -0.023 **  -0.038 *** 
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(Table 5 continued)   
 Top Partition (Top 25% GM)  Bottom Partition (Bottom 25% GM) 
 Aligned  Misaligned  Difference  Aligned  Misaligned  Difference 
Intgblei,t 0.013   -0.008 *  0.021 **  0.015 ***  -0.012   0.027 ** 
Agei,t 0.004   0.004   0.000   0.015 ***  0.002   0.013   
Repi,t 0.010   0.017 *  -0.007   0.005   0.018 **  -0.013   
R&Di,t 0.007   -0.002   0.008   -0.030 ***  -0.018 **  -0.012   
Advi,t 0.005   0.005   0.001   0.002   -0.001   0.003   
Includes industry and year dummies 
N 1094   3329      3516   913     
Adj R
2
 0.3575     0.3715           0.6060     0.5848         
The full sample consists of 8,852 firm-year observations for 2,165 firms covering the period from 2002-2011, and *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively. 
Ei,t is income before extraordinary items but including special items defined as net income plus discontinued operations and income taxes 
all scaled by total assets for firm i at time t.  
LgSIi,t is an indicator variable that is one for firms with large special items and zero otherwise, where large special items is defined as total 
special items that exceed 1% of average total assets for firm i at time t. 
Lossi,t is an indicator variable that is one for firms with net income that is less than zero and a zero otherwise  for firm i at time t. 
Intgblei,t is an indicator variable that is one for firms with intangible assets that are greater than zero and a zero otherwise for firm i at time 
t.  
Agei,t is a sum of the number of years since the firm was first listed on Compustat for firm i at time t. 
Repi,t is reputation and is an indicator variable of one if the firm is on Fortune’s America’s Most Admired Companies list and a zero 
otherwise for firm i at time t. 
R&Di,t is an indicator variable having the value of one if the firm’s research and development expense is greater than zero and a zero 
otherwise firm i at time t. 
Advi,t is an indicator variable of one if the firm’s advertising expense is greater than zero and a zero otherwise for firm i at time t. 
Moderatori,t is one of the following: 
Sizei,t is an indicator variable having a value of one if the natural logarithm of the market value of equity is smaller than the median 
and zero otherwise for firm i at time t. 
Levi,t is an indicator variable having a value of one if long-term debt scaled by total assets is smaller than the median and zero 
otherwise for firm i at time t. 
MBi,t is an indicator variable having a value of one if the market-to-book equity ratio is smaller than the median and zero 
otherwise, where the market-to-book equity ratio is calculated as the market value of equity over book value of equity for 
firm i at time t. 
Govi,t is the net KLD rating for corporate governance, measured as the number of strengths minus the number of concerns for firm 
i at time t. 
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not support H2(a) but rather suggest that firm size is not an important influence on earnings 
persistence. 
Table 5 Panel B reports the analysis for leverage as the moderator variable.  H2(b) 
suggests that earnings persistence will be higher for firms with relatively lower levels of debt.  
The results in the Top Partition provide no support for H2(b).  The difference in the interaction 
term in the Top Partition is 0.119 and is statistically insignificant.  However in the Bottom 
Partition the difference in the interaction term is -0.136 and is statistically significant at the 1% 
level.  These results suggest that leverage is not all that important in the relation with earnings 
persistence for differentiators, but a high level of leverage is negatively associated with earnings 
persistence for the cost leader.  I interpret these results to indicate that leverage is little more than 
a financing choice for the differentiator, presumably, because generating the necessary cash to 
pay off this debt is achievable for a firm with a relatively high gross margin.  However for the 
cost leader, who tends to be more entrenched in a given line of business and generates relatively 
low gross margins, high levels of debt have a destructive impact on earnings persistence.  The 
results in Panel B do not support H2(b) in the Top Partition but do support H2(b) in the Bottom 
Partition. 
Table 5 Panel C reports the analysis for firm growth as the moderator variable.  H2(c) 
suggests that earnings persistence will be higher for firms with relatively lower levels of growth.  
The results in the Top Partition provide no support for H2(c).  The difference in the interaction 
term in the Top Partition is -0.126 and is statistically insignificant.  Likewise the results in the 
Bottom Partition provide no support for H2(c).   In the Bottom Partition the difference in the 
interaction term is 0.082 and is statistically insignificant.  These results suggest that firm growth 
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is not an important factor in the relation with earnings persistence for differentiators or for cost 
leaders.   
Table 5 Panel D reports the analysis for corporate governance as the moderator variable.  
H2(d) suggests that earnings persistence will be higher for firms that are relatively well 
governed.  The results in the Top Partition provide no support for H2(d).  The difference in the 
interaction term in the Top Partition is 0.168 and is statistically insignificant.  However in the 
Bottom Partition the difference in the interaction term is 0.164 and is statistically significant at 
the 5% level.  These results suggest that corporate governance is not all that important in the 
relation with earnings persistence for differentiators, but firms competing as cost leaders enjoy 
more persistent earnings if they have high levels of corporate governance.  Beyond just the 
difference in the coefficients in this panel is the negative and significant coefficient for 
Misaligned Firms in both partitions.  I interpret this finding to indicate that well governed 
Misaligned Firms are restrained in their ability to manipulate earnings and therefore these firms 
are subject to more volatility in their reported earnings.  This increase in volatility reduces 
earnings persistence and drives the negative sign reported in Table 5 Panel D. 
Table 6 presents the first set of results designed to consider the market’s reaction to firm 
alignment.  The previous analysis all focused on the relation between Aligned Firms and 
earnings persistence, with results that suggest that there is a positive relation between these two.  
This next series of tests are designed to determine if the relation between Aligned Firms and 
earnings persistence is understood by market participants.   
Table 6 examines earnings persistence parsed between the Top and Bottom Partitions, 
based on gross margin, and then parsed again between Aligned and Misaligned Firms.  In this 
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analysis I indirectly test the explanatory power of earnings by examining the R
2
 from three 
different versions of Eq. (3).  In Panel A the analysis is conducted using a version of Eq. (3) that 
excluded consensus analysts’ forecasts to provide an R2 that captures the explanatory power of 
earnings.  In Panel B the analysis is conducted using a version of Eq. (3) that excluded current 
earnings and therefore provide an R
2
 that captures the explanatory power of analysts’ forecasts.  
And then in Panel C the analysis is conducted using the full model of Eq. (3) that included both 
consensus analysts’ forecasts and current earnings.  The analysis is then based on the R2 from the 
three versions of the model.  Subtracting the R
2
F in Panel B from the R
2
EF in Panel C results in 
the incremental explanatory power of earnings as reported in Panel A.  Subtracting the R
2
E in 
Panel A from the R
2
EF in Panel C results in the incremental explanatory power of analysts’ 
forecasts as reported in Panel B, and it is this estimation that is of most interest.  
If market participants understand the relation between Aligned Firms and earnings that is 
documented in Table 4 then they should place greater confidence in the reported earnings of 
Aligned Firms as compared to Misaligned Firms.  As users of financial reporting place more 
emphasis on current earnings due to their higher persistence, the relative earnings persistence, 
with results that suggest that there is a positive relation between these two.  This next series of 
tests are designed to determine if the relation between Aligned Firms and earnings persistence is 
understood by market participants.  
Table 6 examines earnings persistence parsed between the Top and Bottom Partitions, 
based on gross margin, and then parsed again between Aligned and Misaligned Firms.  In this 
analysis I indirectly test the explanatory power of earnings by examining the R
2
 from three 
different versions of Eq. (3).  In Panel A the analysis is conducted using a version of Eq. (3) that 
excluded consensus analysts’ forecasts to provide an R2 that captures the explanatory power of 
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TABLE 6 
Tests of the market reaction to firm alignment using analysts’ forecasts 
 
Pricet = λ1 + λ2Ei,t + λ3Forecasti,t
t-1
 + λ4LgSIi,t + λ5Lossi,t + λ6Intgblei,t + λ7Agei,t + λ8Repi,t + λ9R&Di,t + 
λ10Advi,t + λiInd_Dummyi,t + λjYr_Dummyi,t + ε3i,t 
            
Panel A: Analysis with Earnings only 
 Top Partition (Top 25% GM)  Bottom Partition (Bottom 25% GM) 
 Aligned   Misaligned   Aligned   Misaligned 
Intercept 13.844 **   21.364 ***   14.791 ***   31.614 *** 
Ei,t 68.111 ***   68.835 ***   66.542 ***   49.916 *** 
LgSIi,t 1.359     -6.004 **   -8.510 ***   -2.286   
Lossi,t -6.722     -7.269 **   -1.911     -5.768 * 
Intgblei,t 3.368     3.714 *   2.243     2.853   
Agei,t 6.950 ***   1.189     3.461 ***   -1.810   
Repi,t 8.511 ***   11.624 ***   12.882 ***   11.064 *** 
R&Di,t -2.205     1.818     3.558 ***   4.313 * 
Advi,t -1.032     -7.530 ***   -2.889 **   -2.637   
Includes industry and year dummies 
N 549             795           1,130      329  
Adj R
2
E 0.2400     0.1889     0.2677     0.2668  
            
Incremental Explanatory Power of Earnings 
R
2
EF - R
2
F 0.0097     0.0165     0.0271     0.0266  
 
Panel B: Analysis with Forecast only 
 Top Partition (Top 25% GM)  Bottom Partition (Bottom 25% GM) 
 Aligned   Misaligned   Aligned   Misaligned 
Intercept 15.437 ***   12.291 ***   11.516 ***   21.811 *** 
Forecasti,t 8.248 ***   9.262 ***   6.311 ***   5.968 *** 
LgSIi,t 5.328     -4.586 *   -4.132     0.821   
Lossi,t -5.802     -0.722     -2.973 *   -4.290 * 
Intgblei,t 1.639     2.821     -0.992     0.414   
Agei,t 1.296     -0.936     3.085 ***   -1.280   
Repi,t 5.104 ***   5.256 **   5.833 ***   9.318 *** 
R&Di,t 0.793     2.133     4.317 ***   3.994 * 
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(Table 6 continued)           
 Top Partition (Top 25% GM)  Bottom Partition (Bottom 25% GM) 
 Aligned   Misaligned   Aligned   Misaligned 
Advi,t -1.688     -3.614 ***   -2.359 **   -3.359 * 
Includes industry and year dummies 
N 549              795           1,130      329   
Adj R
2
F 0.4091     0.4328     0.4136     0.4345  
            
Incremental Explanatory Power of Forecast 
R
2
EF - R
2
E 0.1788     0.2604     0.1730     0.1943  
            
Panel C: Analysis with both Earnings and Forecast 
 Top Partition (Top 25% GM)  Bottom Partition (Bottom 25% GM) 
 Aligned   Misaligned   Aligned   Misaligned 
Intercept 12.786 ***   10.268 ***   9.426 ***   20.309 *** 
Ei,t 34.037 ***   38.275 ***   47.557 ***   42.620 *** 
Forecasti,t 7.779 ***   8.798 ***   5.934 ***   5.824 *** 
LgSIi,t 4.258 **   -4.947 **   -5.840 **   -1.161   
Lossi,t -0.436     3.737     3.688 *   2.297   
Intgblei,t 1.893     3.507 **   -0.275     0.188   
Agei,t 1.769     -0.667     3.058 ***   -1.628   
Repi,t 5.015 ***   5.372 **   6.232 ***   8.419 *** 
R&Di,t 0.201     1.875     3.832 ***   4.297 ** 
Advi,t -1.920     -4.128 ***   -2.790 **   -2.942   
Includes industry and year dummies 
N 549              795           1,130      329   
Adj R
2
EF 0.4188     0.4493     0.4407     0.4611  
The reduced sample consists of 3,151 firm-year observations for 648 firms covering the period from 2002-
2011, and *, **, and *** indicate significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively.  In the table 
above R
2
E is the R
2
 from the analysis that includes earnings only, R
2
F is the R
2
 from the analysis that 
includes analysts’ forecasts only, and R2EF is the R
2
 from the analysis that includes earnings and analysts’ 
forecasts. 
Pricei,t is the closing price on the last day of the fiscal year as reported by CRSP for firm i at time t.  
Ei,t is income before extraordinary items but including special items defined as net income plus 
discontinued operations and income taxes all scaled by total assets for firm i at time t. 
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(Table 6 continued) 
Forecasti,t
t-1
 is the first consensus analysts’ forecasts provided after the prior year’s announcement for the 
current year end for firm i at time t. 
LgSIi,t is an indicator variable that is one for firms with large special items and zero otherwise, where large 
special items is defined as total special items that exceed 1% of average total assets for firm i at 
time t. 
Lossi,t is an indicator variable that is one for firms with net income that is less than zero and a zero 
otherwise  for firm i at time t. 
Intgblei,t is an indicator variable that is one for firms with intangible assets that are greater than zero and a 
zero otherwise for firm i at time t.  
Agei,t is a sum of the number of years since the firm was first listed on Compustat for firm i at time t. 
Repi,t is reputation and is an indicator variable of one if the firm is on Fortune’s America’s Most Admired 
Companies list and a zero otherwise for firm i at time t. 
R&Di,t is an indicator variable having the value of one if the firm’s research and development expense is 
greater than zero and a zero otherwise firm i at time t. 
Advi,t is an indicator variable of one if the firm’s advertising expense is greater than zero and a zero 
otherwise for firm i at time t. 
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earnings.  In Panel B the analysis is conducted using a version of Eq. (3) that excluded current 
earnings and therefore provide an R
2
 that captures the explanatory power of analysts’ forecasts.  
And then in Panel C the analysis is conducted using the full model of Eq. (3) that included both 
consensus analysts’ forecasts and current earnings.  The analysis is then based on the R2 from the 
three versions of the model.  Subtracting the R
2
F in Panel B from the R
2
EF in Panel C results in 
the incremental explanatory power of earnings as reported in Panel A.  Subtracting the R
2
E in 
Panel A from the R
2
EF in Panel C results in the incremental explanatory power of analysts’ 
forecasts as reported in Panel B, and it is this estimation that is of most interest.  Assuming, 
market participants understand the relation between Aligned Firms and earnings persistence the 
incremental explanatory power of analysts’ forecasts should be lower for Aligned Firms as 
compared to Misaligned Firms.  Lower incremental explanatory power of analysts’ forecasts for 
Aligned Firms is consistent with H3. 
The results presented in Table 6 (Panel B) show the incremental explanatory power of 
analysts’ forecasts for the Top Partition to be 0.1788 and 0.2604 for Aligned and Misaligned 
Firms respectively, and for the Bottom Partition 0.1730 and 0.1943 for Aligned and Misaligned 
Firms respectively.  As the incremental explanatory power of analysts’ forecasts is higher for 
Misaligned Firms in both the Top and Bottom Partitions, the results support H3.  I interpret these 
findings to suggest that market participants are aware of the relation between Aligned Firms and 
earnings persistence and in settings where misalignment occurs investors seek out additional 
information beyond the information contained in earnings, specifically relying on the “new” 
information provided in analysts’ forecasts.    
Table 7 examines the impact alignment has on the relation between abnormal returns and 
unexpected earnings.  In this analysis the variable of interest is the interaction of unexpected 
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TABLE 7 
Tests of the market reaction to firm alignment where actuals equaled or beat forecast by 1 cent or less 
 
AbReti,t = ω0 + ω1UEi,t + ω2Aligni,t + ω3(UEi,t*Aligni,t) + ω4FirmSizei,t + ω5Lossi,t + ω6Betai,t + ω7DtoEi,t + ω8Analystsi,t + ε4i,t 
                  
Panel A: Abnormal return based on decile portfolios formed using Scholes-Williams' betas 
 
 Top Partition (Top 25% GM)  Bottom Partition (Bottom 25% GM) 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Intercept 0.442 ***  0.552   0.316   -0.039   -1.835   -1.192  
UEi,t 7.661 ***  6.978 **  4.588   1.771   -7.653   -7.643  
Aligni,t  -0.594 ***  -0.567 ***  -0.318   1.445 **  1.171 **  1.329 ** 
UEi,t*Aligni,t -7.374 **  -6.811 *  -5.174   20.806 **  19.873 **  24.315 *** 
FirmSizei,t    -0.038   0.008      0.019   -0.035   
Betai,t    0.025   0.157      1.044 ***  1.006 *** 
DtoEi,t    0.008   -0.025      -0.066   -0.241 * 
Analystsi,t    0.013   -0.010      0.031   0.059  
Industry and year dummies   Included         Included  
Adj R
2
 0.1959     0.1624     0.2881     0.1273     0.3668     0.5484   
                  
Panel B: Abnormal return based on decile portfolios formed using firm size 
 
 Top Partition (Top 25% GM)  Bottom Partition (Bottom 25% GM) 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Intercept 0.392 **  0.263   0.030   -0.009   -1.987   -1.328  
UEi,t 8.088 **  6.913 **  4.733   3.607   -6.295   -6.181  
Aligni,t  -0.595 ***  -0.592 **  -0.321   1.371 **  1.113 **  1.299 ** 
UEi,t*Aligni,t -7.727 *  -7.052   -4.821   18.553 *  18.097 **  22.225 ** 
FirmSizei,t    -0.024   0.039      0.021   -0.033   
Betai,t    0.111   0.252      1.122 ***  1.101 *** 
DtoEi,t    0.013   -0.022      -0.026   -0.225 * 
Analystsi,t    0.014   -0.013      0.030   0.064  
Industry and year dummies   Included         Included  
Adj R
2
 0.1478   0.1303   0.2998   0.1167   0.3866   0.5808   
The reduced sample consists of 3,151 firm-year observations for 648 firms covering the period from 2002-2011, and *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively.  Model 1 is the base model without any controls, Model 2 includes the controls but  
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(Table 7 continued) 
excluded the industry and year dummies, and Model 3 is the full model, including all controls as well as the industry and year dummies. 
AbReti,t is the daily compounded return from one day after the prior periods announcement date to one day after the current period’s 
announcement date less the mean return from the portfolio decile for firm i at time t. 
UEi,t is unexpected earnings calculated as current period earnings less the first consensus analysts’ forecasts provided after the prior year’s 
announcement for the current year end for firm i at time t. 
Aligni,t is an indicator variable having the value of one if the firm is an Aligned Firm and a zero otherwise for firm i at time t. 
FirmSizei,t is the natural logarithum of the market value of equity for firm i at time t. 
Betai,t is the firm beta as defined by Scholes-Williams (1977) for firm i at time t. 
DtoEi,t is the debt to equity ratio, calculated as total debt divided by total equity for firm i at time t. 
Anlaystsi,t is the number of analysts following the firm as reported by IBES for firm i at time t. 
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earnings with Aligned Firms (UEi,t*Aligni,t).  For the analysis presented in Table 7 the data is 
parsed into four groups based on the accuracy of forecasted earnings as compared to reported 
earnings.  These four groups are as follows: large miss, defined as actual earnings per share 
(EPS) being more than one cent below consensus analysts’ forecasts; miss, defined as EPS that is 
between one cent below consensus analysts’ forecasts and meeting consensus analysts’ forecasts; 
meet or beat, defined as EPS that is between consensus analysts’ forecasts and one cent above 
consensus analysts’ forecasts; and exceed, defined as EPS that is more than one cent above 
consensus analysts’ forecasts.  Within each of these four groups the data is then parsed into the 
Top or Bottom Partition based on gross margin percentage.  After conducting the analysis, the 
interaction term (ω3) was insignificant for all groups except for the meet or beat group.  As such 
only the meet or beat group is reported in Table 7. 
For Table 7 Panel A the calculation of abnormal returns is based on the creation of ten 
portfolios formed using the Scholes-William (1977) betas.  For the Top Partition the coefficient 
on the interaction term (ω3) declines in significance as the controls are added, and once all 
controls are included that coefficient is insignificant.  However, in the Bottom Partition the 
coefficient remains significant in all version of the model.  These results do not provide support 
for H3 in the Top Partition but support H3 in the Bottom Partition.  These results show that 
alignment is important for the cost leader but less important for the differentiator. 
In Table 7 Panel B the calculation of abnormal returns is based on the creation of ten portfolios 
formed using firm size.  For the Top Partition the coefficient on the interaction term declines in 
magnitude and in significance as the controls are added, and once all controls are included the 
coefficient is insignificant.  However, in the Bottom Partition the coefficient remains significant 
in all version of the model.  These results do not support H3 in the Top Partition but support H3 
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in the Bottom Partition.  As above in Panel A these results suggest alignment is most important 
for the cost leader but less important for the differentiator, which is consistent with the results 
presented in Table 6.  I interpret these findings to indicate that every cost must be carefully 
managed by the cost leader and therefore any cost that does not align with the minimal cost 
structure is a hindrance to the firm.  For the differentiator, the results suggest that the perception 
of uniqueness within the product can be created in many ways, and while employee and 
customer relations, is an important avenue it is not the only option. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENT 
In this paper I examine the impact of the alignment of a firm’s employee and customer 
relations with the firm’s competitive strategy on earnings persistence and the market’s reaction 
to this relation.  I use a subset of the KLD ratings to assess firm alignment, specifically the 
qualitative areas of  employee relations and product quality.  These ratings serve as a proxy for 
the firm’s focus on employee and customer relations, respectively.  To determine alignment the 
firm’s focus on employee and customer relations must be evaluated within a competitive context, 
namely the classification system described by Porter (1998).  By narrowing the sample to only 
include differentiators and cost leaders the study has a sound theoretical foundation upon which 
to conduct the analysis.  To operationalize Porter’s classification system I partition the sample 
based on gross margin percentage, with the top 25% of the distribution designated as 
differentiators and the bottom 25% as cost leaders. 
Because the testing will be based on firms with a focus on either employee relations, 
customer relations, or both, I begin by demonstrating that combining employee and customer 
relations together is a reasonable approach.  By testing that a focus on employee and customer 
relations alone will not drive an increase in earnings persistence, the study shows it is the 
alignment of a firm’s focus that is critical in the relation with earnings persistence.  I then 
examine the key firm characteristics of: firm size, the level of firm indebtedness, the level of firm 
growth, and the strength of the firm’s corporate governance and consider the impact each of 
these characteristics have on earnings persistence.  My results suggest that firm size and growth 
are of little importance when considering the alignment of a firm’s focus and its competitive 
strategy.  However, for cost leaders, the characteristics of leverage and corporate governance are 
impacted by firm alignment.   
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In an effort to further my understanding of firm alignment I tested the market’s reaction 
to alignment employing two different tests.  First I considered the implications of firm alignment 
on the incremental explanatory power of analysts’ forecasts.  In conducting this analysis I use the 
full model that is then compared to two variations of that model.  The interpretation of the 
analysis relies on the difference in the R
2
 between the different versions of the model.  By 
examining the differences in the R
2
, I am able to estimate the incremental explanatory power of 
analysts’ forecasts and show that incremental explanatory power of analysts’ forecasts is lower 
for Aligned Firms as they have more persistent earnings.  I also test the market’s reaction to firm 
alignment by examining the relation between abnormal earnings and unexpected earnings when 
reported EPS meets or beats consensus analysts’ forecasts by one cent or less.  These results 
show investors in the Bottom Partition place more confidence in unexpected earnings for 
Aligned Firms than for Misaligned Firms. 
Taken as a whole this study demonstrates that firm alignment plays a role in earnings 
quality and that alignment is a useful characteristics to investors.  When firms are not aligned, 
investors rely more heavily on the efforts of financial analysts to provide a deeper understanding 
of the firm beyond the information provided by earnings alone.  As with any study this analysis 
is subject to weaknesses.  It is possible that proxies used do not adequately represent the 
constructs intended as such the inferences are erroneous; however, given the theoretical 
underpinnings of the study I do not believe this to be the case.  It is also possible that 
circumstance may exist where it is optimal for a firm to choose to be misaligned.  Such cases 
work against the findings herein and an examination of these cases will be left for future 
research.  Additionally, as suggested by Kim et al. (2012), the use of subcategories of KLD 
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ratings provides a fertile academic research space, and one that needs to be further explored with 
future studies. 
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APPENDIX 
Variable Definitions 
  
Aligned Firms having an assessment greater than zero in the KLD category of “Employee 
Relations”, “Product Quality” or both for firms in the Top Partition, or having a zero 
in KLD’s assessment of “Employee Relations” and “Product Quality” for firms in the 
Bottom Partition. 
 
Misaligned Firms having a zero in KLD’ assessment “Employee Relations” and “Product Quality” for 
firms in the Top Partition, or having an assessment greater than zero in the KLD 
category of “Employee Relations”, “Product Quality” or both for firms in the Bottom 
Partition. 
 
Top Partition is the top quartile of firms after the firms were ordered based on gross margin 
percentage from highest to lowest. 
 
Bottom Partition is the bottom quartile of firms after the firms were ordered based on gross margin 
percentage from highest to lowest. 
 
  
AbReti,t is the daily compounded return from one day after the prior periods announcement 
date to one day after the current period’s announcement date less the mean return 
from the decile for firm i at time t. 
 
Advi,t is an indicator variable having the value of one if advertising expense (Adv1) was 
greater than zero and a zero otherwise firm i at time t. 
 
Adv1i,t is calculated as advertising expense divided by net sales for firm i at time t. 
 
Agei,t is an indicator variable having a value of one if firm age (Age1) is greater than the 
sample median and a zero otherwise firm i at time t. 
 
Age1i,t is the sum of the number of years since firm i was first listed on Compustat at time t. 
 
Aligni,t is an indicator variable having the value of one if the firm is an Aligned Firm and a 
zero otherwise for firm i at time t.  
 
Anlaystsi,t is the number of analysts following the firm per  IBES for firm i at time t. 
 
Betai,t is the firm beta as defined by Scholes-Williams (1977) for firm i at time t. 
 
DtoEi,t is total debt divided by total equity for firm i at time t. 
 
Ei,t is net income plus discontinued operations and income taxes all scaled by total assets 
for firm i at time t. 
 
FirmSizei,t is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity for firm i at time t. 
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Govi,t is an indicator variable having a value of one if the net KLD rating for corporate 
governance, measured as the number of strengths minus the number of concerns is 
greater than zero and zero otherwise for firm i at time t.   
 
Ind_Dummiesi,t is an indicator variable having the value of one if the firm is included in the industry 
portfolio and a zero otherwise, where the industry portfolios is one of the twelve 
Fama French industry portfolios defined by SIC code. 
 
Intgblei,t is an indicator variable having the value of one for firms with intangible assets that 
are greater than zero and a zero otherwise for firm i at time t. 
 
Levi,t is an indicator variable having a value of one if long-term debt scaled by total assets 
is larger than the median for the sample and zero otherwise for firm i at time t.   
 
LgSIi,t is an indicator variable having the value of one for firms with large special items and 
zero otherwise, where large special items is defined as total special items that exceed 
1% of average total assets for firm i at time t.  
 
Lossi,t is an indicator variable having the value of one for firms with net income that is less 
than zero and a zero otherwise for firm i at time t. 
 
MBi,t is an indicator variable having a value of one if the market-to-book equity ratio is 
larger than the median for the sample and zero otherwise, where the market-to-book 
equity ratio is calculated as the market value of equity over book value of equity for 
firm i at time t.   
 
Repi,t is an indicator variable having the value of one if firm i is on Fortune’s America’s 
Most Admired Companies list and a zero otherwise at time t. 
 
R&Di,t is an indicator variable having the value of one if the firm’s research and 
development expense (R&D1) is greater than zero and a zero otherwise for firm i at 
time t. 
 
R&D1i,t is research and development expense divided by net sales for firm i at time t. 
 
Sizei,t is an indicator variable having a value of one if the natural logarithm of the market 
value of equity is smaller than the median for the sample and zero otherwise for firm 
i at time t. 
 
UEi,t is unexpected earnings calculated as current period earnings less the first consensus 
analysts’ forecasts provided after the prior year’s announcement for the current year 
end for firm i at time t. 
 
Yr_Dummiesi,t is an indicator variable having the value of one if the observation is for the given year 
and a zero otherwise. 
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